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Abstract
A central question in intertemporal decision making is why people reverse their own past choices. Someone
who initially prefers a long-run outcome might fail to maintain that preference for long enough to see the
outcome realized. Such behavior is usually understood as reflecting preference instability or self-control
failure. However, if a decision maker is unsure exactly how long an awaited outcome will be delayed, a reversal
can constitute the rational, utility-maximizing course of action. In the present behavioral experiments, we
placed participants in timing environments where persistence toward delayed rewards was either productive
or counterproductive. Our results show that human decision makers are responsive to statistical timing cues,
modulating their level of persistence according to the distribution of delay durations they encounter. We
conclude that temporal expectations act as a powerful and adaptive influence on people’s tendency to sustain
patient decisions.
Highlights
► Participants decided how long to wait for temporally uncertain rewards. ► The distribution of possible
delays determines whether persistence is productive. ► Different conditions, matched for reward rate,
required high or low persistence. ► With experience, decision makers appropriately adjusted their willingness
to wait. ► Apparent failures of persistence can reflect adaptive temporal judgments.
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Abstract
A central question in intertemporal decision making is why people reverse their own past choices.
Someone who initially prefers a long-run outcome might fail to maintain that preference for long
enough to see the outcome realized. Such behavior is usually understood as reflecting preference
instability or self-control failure. However, if a decision maker is unsure exactly how long an
awaited outcome will be delayed, a reversal can constitute the rational, utility-maximizing course
of action. In the present behavioral experiments, we placed participants in timing environments
where persistence toward delayed rewards was either productive or counterproductive. Our results
show that human decision makers are responsive to statistical timing cues, modulating their level
of persistence according to the distribution of delay durations they encounter. We conclude that
temporal expectations act as a powerful and adaptive influence on people’s tendency to sustain
patient decisions.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Failures of persistence
Intertemporal decision behavior can appear to be dynamically inconsistent. As Ainslie
(1975) framed the problem, “people often change their preferences as time passes, even
though they have found out nothing new about their situation” (p. 464). Reversals of choices
in domains as diverse and consequential as diet, addiction, and financial planning create the
impression that preferences are fundamentally unstable. Understanding the cause of these
reversals is important, since a tendency to sustain the pursuit of delayed rewards correlates
with numerous positive life outcomes (Duckworth & Seligman, 2005; Mischel, Shoda, &
Peake, 1988; Shoda, Mischel, & Peake, 1990).
The predominant theoretical explanations for such reversals hold that multiple internal
subsystems trade off control over behavior. The relevant subsystems have been variously
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characterized as cool vs. hot (Loewenstein, 1996; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), controlled vs.
automatic (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Stanovich & West, 2000),
farsighted vs. myopic (Laibson, 1997; McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004) or
instrumental vs. Pavlovian (Dayan, Niv, Seymour, & Daw, 2006). A related idea is that
preference instability can arise from non-exponential temporal discounting functions
(Ainslie, 1975; Laibson, 1997; McClure et al., 2004; Strotz, 1955).
Previous theoretical enterprises have focused largely on situations where decision makers
hold full information about the times at which future outcomes will occur. However, the
timing of real-world events is not always so predictable. Decision makers routinely wait for
buses, job offers, weight loss, and other outcomes characterized by significant temporal
uncertainty. Timing uncertainty is also a central feature of the well-known delay-of-
gratification paradigm (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970), where young children must decide how
long to continue waiting for a preferred food reward, while lacking any information about
how long the delay will last. Even though persistence is usually associated with successful
self-control, temporal uncertainty can create situations where limits on persistence are
appropriate (Dasgupta & Maskin, 2005; Rachlin, 2000). Our aim in the present paper is to
demonstrate that behavior resembling persistence failure can arise as the rational response to
uncertainty about an awaited outcome’s timing.
1.2. Persistence under temporal uncertainty
A temporally uncertain outcome can be described in terms of a probability distribution over
its potential times of arrival. Different timing distributions will apply to different categories
of events, and the shape of the distribution determines how the expected remaining delay
will change as time passes. This general phenomenon has been described previously in the
contexts of survival and reliability analysis (e.g., Elandt-Johnson & Johnson, 1980) and
Bayesian cognitive judgment (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2006). Here we present an overview
focusing on the implications for intertemporal decision making (for quantitative details see
Section 2.3, below).
If delay durations in a given environment follow a uniform or Gaussian distribution, the
expected remaining delay will become steadily shorter as time elapses. Gaussian
distributions characterize delimited events, such as movies or human lifetimes (Griffiths &
Tenenbaum, 2006). Consider, for example, the case of waiting for a talk to end. If it has
gone on longer than expected, one might be inclined to assume that only a small amount of
time still remains. Figure 1 illustrates this phenomenon for a Gaussian distribution
(specifically, a truncated Gaussian with a lower bound corresponding to the current time).
Under the standard assumption that rewards are subjectively discounted as a function of
their delay (Samuelson, 1937), rewards with Gaussian timing will tend to increase in present
subjective value over time while they are being awaited. If a delayed reward is initially
preferred relative to other alternatives that are available immediately, this preference should
strengthen as time passes. All else equal, the initial patient choice should be sustained.
A very different situation can occur if the reward’s timing follows a heavy-tailed distribution
(e.g., a power function; see Figure 1). In this case, the expected remaining delay can
increase with the passage of time. Heavy-tailed distributions describe open-ended events,
where some delays are short but others are indefinitely long. Consider the example of
waiting for a reply to an email (Barabási, 2005). One might initially expect a reply to come
quickly, but if it does not, one might conclude that the remaining delay will be longer than
initially expected.
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If a reward is characterized by a heavy-tailed timing distribution, its expected delivery time
grows more distant with time elapsed, implying that its present subjective value
progressively deteriorates. Even if the delayed reward were initially preferred, it might
eventually become so remote that it no longer outcompeted immediately available
alternatives. Under these circumstances, decision makers could produce reversing sequences
of choices, equivalent to the patterns often attributed to self-control failure: they might
choose a delayed reward, wait for a period of time, and then shift to an immediate outcome
instead. Such a decision maker would not be dynamically inconsistent, but would instead be
responding rationally to new information gained from observing the passage of time. There
is precedent for the idea that mere time passage may be informative in this way, warranting
reassessments of both the delay and the degree of risk associated with future events
(Dasgupta & Maskin, 2005; Fawcett, McNamara, & Houston, 2012; Rachlin, 2000; Sozou,
1998).
Heavy-tailed distributions characterize timing in a variety of real-life situations where
intervals are open-ended. Distributions with this form have been empirically documented in
examinations of the time between emails (Barabási, 2005), the length of hospital stays
(Harrison & Millard, 1991), and time between retrievals of the same memory (Anderson &
Schooler, 1991). Heavy-tailed distributions also provide a reasonable prior when the true
distribution is unknown (Gott, 1993, 1994; Jeffreys, 1983). It seems plausible that decision
makers routinely encounter environments characterized by heavy-tailed timing statistics, in
which they must continually reassess whether a formerly preferred delayed outcome remains
worth pursuing.
Decision makers are also likely to encounter situations where timing is uncertain but
delimited. For example, endogenous variability in time-interval perception and memory can
produce a Gaussian pattern of subjective uncertainty (i.e., scalar variability; Gallistel &
Gibbon, 2000; Gibbon, 1977). This kind of situation would call for persistence: if a delayed
reward was worth pursuing in the first place, it should be pursued until it is obtained.
The above observations lead to a hypothesis: a person’s willingness to continue waiting
ought to depend on a dynamically updated estimate of the time at which an awaited outcome
will arrive. This estimate, in turn, should depend on the applicable timing statistics.
Environments with Gaussian or uniform timing statistics should elicit strong persistence. In
contrast, environments characterized by heavy-tailed timing statistics should cause people to
limit how long they are willing to wait.
Existing evidence suggests it is plausible that people form context-sensitive time estimates
and update these estimates dynamically. Properties of statistical distributions can be encoded
rapidly from direct experience (Körding & Wolpert, 2004), and processes resembling valid
Bayesian inference support both explicit temporal judgments (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2006,
2011; Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010) and time-dependent reward-seeking behavior (Balci,
Freestone, & Gallistel, 2009; Bateson & Kacelnik, 1995; Catania & Reynolds, 1968).
However, little evidence as yet bears on the role of temporal inference during choices that
involve waiting for delayed outcomes. Even though preference reversals may sometimes be
theoretically rational (Dasgupta & Maskin, 2005; Fawcett et al., 2012), empirical data to
date have been interpreted largely in terms of limitations on people’s capacity to exert self
control (Baumeister et al., 1998).
1.3. The present work
Here we seek direct empirical evidence that human decision makers calibrate their
willingness to tolerate delay on the basis of experience with time-interval distributions.
Participants in our first experiment were given repeated opportunities to wait for randomly
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timed delayed rewards, and could decide at any time to stop waiting and accept a small
immediate reward instead. We placed participants in environments with either uniform or
heavy-tailed distributions of time intervals, hypothesizing that the two conditions would
elicit different degrees of willingness to persist.
2. Experiment 1
2.1. Overview
Participants were given a fixed time period to harvest monetary rewards. They therefore
faced a rate-maximization objective, akin to a foraging problem. Each reward took a random
length of time to arrive, and participants could wait for only one reward at a time. At any
time they could quit waiting, receive a small immediate reward, and continue to a new trial
after a short inter-trial interval. Delay durations were governed by different probability
distributions in two groups of participants.
One group experienced a uniform distribution (UD; see Fig 2A), spanning 0–12 sec. The
expected remaining delay declined over time, and the reward-maximizing strategy was
always to continue waiting (see Section 2.3). To understand this intuitively, consider a
decision maker who has already waited 6 sec. The delayed reward is guaranteed to arrive
within the next 6 sec, and is therefore an even better prospect than initially, when it was
guaranteed to arrive within 12 sec. If the delayed reward was preferred at the outset, it
should be preferred by a still greater margin after some time has passed.
The second group experienced a truncated heavy-tailed distribution of delays (HTD group;
see Fig. 2A). Here the expected remaining delay initially increased with time waited. The
maximizing strategy called for quitting whenever the reward failed to arrive within the first
few seconds (for details, see Section 2.3). If participants calibrate persistence adaptively,
they should exhibit greater persistence in the UD condition than the HTD condition.
2.2. Methods
2.2.1. Participants—Participants were recruited in a New Jersey shopping mall (n=40; 23
female), age 18–64 (mean=32), with 11–20 years of education (mean=15). Each participant
was randomly assigned to either the UD or HTD condition (n=20 each). The proportion
female was 10/20 in the UD group and 13/20 in the HTD group. The two groups did not
significantly differ with respect to age (UD group median=25, interquartile range
[IQR]=20.5–48.5; HTD group median=24.5, IQR=22.5–44.5; Mann-Whitney U=194,
nUD=20, nHTD=20, p=0.88) or years of education (based on the 35 participants who reported
their level of education; UD group median=15, IQR=12–16; HTD group median=15,
IQR=14–16; Mann-Whitney U=137, nUD=17, nHTD=18, p=0.61).
Assignment to conditions was automated and concealed from the experimenter, and all
participants received identical instructions. Participants were informed that they could
expect to make $5–10 depending on performance, but were not told anything about the
distribution of possible delay times. In both experiments, procedures for testing human
subjects were approved by the applicable institutional review board.
2.2.2. Materials and procedure—The task was programmed using the Psychophysics
Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) extensions for Matlab (The MathWorks, Natick, MA).
Figure 3 shows the interface. A yellow light would stay lit for a random duration before
delivering a 15¢ reward. Participants could choose to wait by leaving the mouse cursor in a
box marked, “Wait for 15¢.” Alternatively, by shifting to a box marked “Take 1¢,”
participants could receive 1¢ and proceed to a new trial. Each outcome (15¢ or 1¢) was
followed by a 2-sec inter-trial interval (ITI). The cursor could remain in either box across
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multiple trials. The task duration was 10 min, and the screen continuously displayed the time
remaining and total earned. Final compensation was rounded up to the next 25¢.
Delays varied randomly from trial to trial, and were scheduled according to a different
distribution in each condition (see Figure 2A). The large reward was delivered at the end of
the scheduled delay on each trial unless the participant chose to take the small reward
earlier. For the UD group, delays were drawn from a continuous uniform distribution
described by the following cumulative distribution function:
(1)
Parameters were a=0 and b=12 sec, so quartile upper boundaries fell at 3, 6, 9, and 12 sec.
For the heavy-tailed distribution we used a truncated generalized Pareto distribution. An
unbounded generalized Pareto distribution has the following cumulative distribution
function:
(2)
Note that Equation 2 omits the location parameter θ, which we set to zero, implying that
zero is the shortest possible delay. Applying an upper bound T gives the following
cumulative distribution function for a truncated generalized Pareto:
(3)
We used parameters k=8, σ=3.4, and T=90 sec, which set quartile upper boundaries at 0.78,
3.56, 15.88, and 90 sec.
We wished to ensure that even short spans of experience would be representative of the
underlying distribution. To accomplish this, delays were not drawn fully randomly on each
trial, but were sampled from each quartile in random order before a quartile was repeated.
This approach has the disadvantage of introducing subtle sequential structure, but the
important advantage of reducing within-condition variability in the timing statistics
participants experienced.
Two demonstration trials preceded the main task. On the first, participants were instructed to
wait for the large reward, which arrived after 5 sec. On the second, participants were
instructed to take the small reward.
2.3. Normative analysis
We define a waiting policy as the time at which a decision maker will give up waiting on
each trial if the large reward has not yet arrived. The expected return for a policy of quitting
at time t may be calculated as follows. Let pt be the proportion of rewards delivered earlier
than t. Let τt be the mean duration of these rewarded trials. One trial’s expected return, in
dollars, is Rt = 0.15(pt) + 0.01(1−pt). Its expected cost, in seconds, is Ct = τt(pt) + t(1−pt) + 2
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(including the 2-sec ITI). The expected return for policy t over the 600-sec experiment is
600 × Rt/Ct. This is the quantity participants should seek to maximize.
For each condition, we calculated the expected return for a grid of waiting policies spaced
every 0.01 sec from 0 to 20 sec. For policy t, the large-reward probability pt is simply the
value of the cumulative probability distribution function at t (see Equations 1–3). The value
of τt is easy to calculate in the UD condition: τt = t/2. For the HTD condition the calculation
of τt is more complex, though still tractable; in practice, we estimated τt by taking the mean
of 100,000 random samples from the distribution between 0 and t.
Figure 2B shows the expected monetary return for a range of waiting policies. At one
extreme, a policy of quitting every trial immediately yields 1¢ every 2 sec, for $3.00 total (in
either condition). At the other extreme, complete persistence in the UD condition would
yield 15¢ every 8 sec on average, for $11.25. Complete persistence in the HTD condition
would yield poorer results, with a large reward occurring approximately every 15 sec on
average, leading to an expected return of $6.00. The best-performing policy in the HTD
condition is to quit if the reward has not arrived after 2.13 sec; this yields an expected return
of $11.43. A participant who perfectly implemented this policy would obtain the large
reward on 41% of trials, with an average delay on these trials of 725ms. On the remaining
trials the small reward would be selected after a wait of 2.13 sec.
2.4. Data analyses
Individual trials differ in the amount of information they provide regarding a participant’s
waiting policy. Quit trials are the most informative, as they offer a direct estimate of the
limit on an individual’s willingness to persist. When a reward is delivered, however, we
observe only that the person was willing to wait at least the duration of the trial. We
accommodate this situation using statistical methods from survival analysis. Analyses
assessed how long a trial would “survive” without the participant quitting. Rewarded trials
were considered right-censored, analogous to patients who drop out of a clinical study and
yield only a lower bound on their survival.
We constructed a Kaplan-Meier survival curve on the basis of each participant’s responses.
The Kaplan-Meier is a nonparametric estimator of the survival function (Kaplan & Meier,
1958). For each time t, it plots the participant’s probability of waiting at least until t if the
reward is not delivered earlier. Analyses were restricted to the 0–11 sec interval for which
we have observations in both conditions. (Note that we can only observe an individual’s
willingness to wait t seconds if we have trials where the scheduled delay equals or exceeds
t.) The area under the survival curve (AUC) is a useful summary statistic, representing the
average number of seconds an individual was willing to wait within the analyzed interval.
Someone who never quit earlier than 11 sec would have an AUC of 11. One who was
willing to wait up to 3 sec on half the trials and up to 9 sec on the other half would have an
AUC of 6.
Differences in AUC between groups were evaluated using two-tailed nonparametric Mann-
Whitney U tests (also known as Wilcoxon rank sum tests). Single-sample comparisons were
performed using two-tailed nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank tests.
To assess the change in persistence over time, we separately calculated a local,
nonparametric estimate of each subject’s willingness to wait (WTW) every 1 sec throughout
the experiment. During quit trials, this estimate simply consisted of the observed waiting
time. During rewarded trials, the estimate was the longest time waited since the last quit
trial. The WTW estimate was capped at 12 sec to make the two conditions comparable.
McGuire and Kable Page 6
Cognition. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2013 August 01.
$watermark-text
$watermark-text
$watermark-text
2.5. Results
2.5.1. Earnings—Total earnings provide a rough gauge of task success. Each group’s best
possible return was about $11.25. Median earnings were $10.69 (IQR=9.47–11.11) in the
UD group and $7.29 (IQR=6.09–8.70) in the HTD group, which differed significantly
(Mann-Whitney U=32.5, nUD=20, nHTD=20, p<0.001). In the UD group, 12 of 20
participants obtained within $1 of the theoretical optimum. No one performed this well in
the HTD group, where the most any participant earned was $9.83.
2.5.2. Survival analysis—Figure 4A shows survival curves summarizing participants’
persistence, sampled at 1-sec intervals and averaged across subjects in each condition.
Figure 4B shows the corresponding AUC values for each individual. Comparing AUC
values in the two groups confirms the study’s central prediction: the UD group (median
AUC=9.74 sec, IQR=6.10–10.86) showed greater persistence than the HTD group (median
AUC=3.14 sec, IQR=2.02–8.20; Mann-Whitney U=87, nUD=20, nHTD=20, p=0.002). HTD-
group participants waited significantly longer than the reward-maximizing point of 2.13 sec
(signed-rank T=36, n=20, p=0.01). (The equivalent test for the UD group would not be
meaningful, because it was only possible to err on the side of waiting too little.)
2.5.3. Learning over time—Results in Fig 4A–B aggregate over the 10-min task, but
participants started out knowing nothing about the relevant timing distributions. Figure 4C
shows local WTW as a function of time. Median linear trend coefficients differed between
the two groups (Mann-Whitney U=46, nUD=20, nHTD=20, p<0.001), and differed from zero
in each group individually (+0.19sec per min in the UD condition, signed-rank T=10, n=20,
p<0.001; −0.17sec per min in the HTD condition, signed-rank T=43, n=20, p=0.02).
2.5.4. Dynamic reversals—Differences in overall willingness to wait could stem from
two qualitatively different types of behavior. The first involves initially choosing the
delayed outcome but subsequently failing to persist. Such reversals are necessary for success
in the HTD condition (see Figure 2B), even though they could superficially appear to reflect
unstable preferences.
To assess reversals of this type, we ran a version of the survival analysis restricted to trials
with waiting times of 1 sec or greater (Fig. 4D). This fixes each survival curve’s first point
at 1, while leaving the remaining points free to vary. Results show that even when
participants made an initial choice to wait, they sustained that choice for less time in the
HTD condition (median AUC=7.86 sec, IQR=4.95–10.28) than in the UD condition (median
AUC=10.70 sec, IQR=10.29–10.93; Mann-Whitney U=68.5, nUD=20, nHTD=20, p<0.001;
see Fig 4E), consistent with our normative predictions.
Besides reversals, participants can also exhibit outright impatience: they might spend
periods of time ignoring the delayed reward entirely and simply collecting small rewards as
rapidly as possible. We considered a trial “skipped” if the small reward was obtained within
100ms (suggesting the subject chose “Take 1¢” before the trial began). Skipping trials was
an unproductive strategy (see Section 2.3, above). The number of skipped trials varied
substantially across individuals, and was greater in the HTD condition (median=37.5 trials,
IQR=2–88) than the UD condition (median=2 trials, IQR=0–19.5; Mann-Whitney U=112.5,
nUD=20, nHTD=20, p=0.02). Thus, in addition to persisting less, the HTD group was also
more likely to forego the large reward altogether. Given the 2-sec ITI, the HTD-group
median corresponds to about 75 sec spent skipping trials (1/8 of the session).
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There was no evidence that subjects capitalized on nonrandom aspects of the trial sequence
to skip trials with long scheduled delays. The scheduled duration of skipped trials was 0.70
sec shorter on average (SD=2.60) than non-skipped trials.
2.6. Discussion of Experiment 1
Consistent with our hypothesis, decision makers calibrated persistence according to the
time-interval distributions they experienced. Participants showed high persistence when
delays were drawn from a uniform distribution, implying that waiting posed little difficulty
when its value was supported by direct statistical experience. In contrast, a heavy-tailed
distribution of delays elicited limited persistence, with participants selecting delayed
rewards and then giving them up after short periods of waiting. It also elicited increased
impatience, with participants more often skipping the delayed reward altogether. The latter
behavior was counterproductive, but reversals were necessary under the reward-maximizing
strategy.
The two timing conditions were matched for their highest potential earnings, but differed in
a number of specific respects. Delay lengths in the HTD condition were greater on average,
higher-variance, spanned a greater range, and led to lower earnings in practice. Behavioral
differences could, in principle, have stemmed from any of these individual factors. For
example, HTD-group participants might have adopted a lower level of persistence in
response to low earnings, or perhaps in reaction to occasional very long delays.
To narrow the space of possibilities, we replicated the design while introducing a third
timing condition in Experiment 2.
3. Experiment 2
3.1. Overview
Experiment 2 added a condition in which delay lengths followed a bimodal distribution (BD
group; see Fig. 2C). As in the HTD condition, the reward-maximizing strategy was to wait
only a short time for each reward (see Fig. 2D). Many rewards arrived in the first 1 sec, but
those delays that exceeded 1 sec often continued for an additional 10 sec, making it more
productive to quit and move on to a new trial.
The bimodal distribution had the same range, mean, and median as the uniform distribution,
with greater variance. Because mean delays were matched, UD and BD participants could
earn equal amounts of money under a strategy of always waiting. However, those in the BD
group could earn still more under a low-persistence strategy. Participants were not initially
told anything about the range of potential incentive payments, removing any explicit
benchmark. The duration of the task was increased to 20 min.
We hypothesized that decision makers would calibrate persistence advantageously in each
timing environment, waiting longer in the UD condition than in either the HTD or BD
conditions.
3.2. Methods
3.2.1. Participants—Participants were 48 members of the University of Pennsylvania
community (27 female), age 18–38 (mean=21), with 12–20 years of education (mean=14).
Each individual was randomly assigned to the UD, HTD, or BD group (n=16 per group).
Condition assignment was automated and concealed from the experimenter. The proportion
female was 8/16 in the UD group, 8/16 in the HTD group, and 11/16 in the BD group. There
were no significant pairwise group differences in age (UD median=20.5, IQR=19–23.5;
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HTD median=19, IQR=18–21.5; BD median=19.5, IQR=18.5–23; UUD-HTD=91.5, nUD=16,
nHTD=16, p=0.17; UUD-BD=108.5, nUD=16, nBD=16, p=0.47; UHTD-BD=113, nHTD=16,
nBD=16, p=0.58). There also were no pairwise group differences in education (based on the
44 participants who reported their education level; UD median=14, IQR=13–16; HTD
median=12.5, IQR=12–14; BD median=13, IQR=12.25–15.75; UUD-HTD=73, nUD=16,
nHTD=14, p=0.11; UUD-BD=101.5, nUD=16, nBD=15, p=0.48; UHTD-BD=82, nHTD=14,
nBD=15, p=0.33).
Participants received a $10 show-up payment plus incentives earned during the task.
Instructions provided no information about the distribution of delay times or the range of
possible incentive payments.
3.2.2. Materials and procedure—Several parameters were adjusted from Experiment 1
to achieve the desired payoff functions while keeping overall incentive levels moderate.
Participants continuously chose between two boxes labeled “Wait for 20 points” and “Take
1 point.” Points were converted to money at 400pts to $1, paid to the nearest 1¢. Delays
were drawn from one of three distributions, depending on an individual’s condition
assignment (see Fig. 2C). The BD condition used a beta distribution as implemented in
Matlab, with parameters α=0.25, β=0.25, rescaled to span 0–12 sec. Note that this
distribution does not have a simple closed-form expression akin to Equations 1–3 above. Its
density is symmetrical and U-shaped, with quartile upper boundaries at 0.54, 6.00, 11.46,
and 12.00 sec. The HTD condition used a truncated generalized Pareto distribution (see
Equations 2–3), with parameters modified from Experiment 1 (k=4, σ=5.75, T=60 sec) so
that quartile upper boundaries fell at 1.35, 4.70, 15.06, and 60 sec. Each outcome was
followed by an 800ms ITI. The task and analysis methods otherwise matched those in
Experiment 1.
The expected return for various waiting policies was calculated as in Experiment 1. In the
BD condition, the average wait time for large rewards received under each policy was
estimated by taking the mean of 100,000 random draws from the distribution between 0 and
t. The reward-maximizing policy for the UD group was to wait the full 12 sec, implying an
expected incentive payment of $8.82 (5¢ every 6.8 sec for 20 min; see Fig 2D). HTD-group
participants could do similarly well by giving up waiting between 1.3 and 1.9 sec on each
trial; further persistence would reduce earnings. In the BD group, waiting the full 12 sec
implied the same $8.82 return as in the UD group; that is, the expected return under full
persistence for the BD and UD groups was equated. However, BD participants could earn up
to $14.59 if they quit waiting after only 0.26 sec on each trial. Quitting at any point up to 3.1
sec would yield better outcomes than waiting the full time.
To summarize, timing statistics implied that persistence was the best strategy for the UD
group, but the other two groups could perform best by waiting less than 2 sec per trial.
3.3. Results
3.3.1. Total earnings—Median earnings were as follows: in the UD group $8.37
(IQR=8.10–8.68), in the HTD group $5.71 (IQR=5.25–6.28), and in the BD group $8.58
(IQR=7.25–9.23). Earnings were significantly lower in the HTD group than either the UD
group (Mann-Whitney U=6, nUD=16, nHTD=16, p<0.001) or the BD group (Mann-Whitney
U=12, nHTD=16, nBD=16, p<0.001). Earnings did not differ between the UD and BD groups
(Mann-Whitney U=114, nUD=16, nBD=16, p=0.61). Thirteen of 16 participants in the UD
group (and no participants in the other two groups) earned within $1 of the maximum
possible amount.
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3.3.2. Survival analysis—Figures 5A–B show mean survival curves reflecting
willingness to wait in each condition, together with individual participants’ AUC values.
Consistent with our predictions, AUCs were greater in the UD group (median=7.77 sec,
IQR=6.28–9.87) than in either the HTD group (median=3.83 sec, IQR=1.66–5.40; Mann-
Whitney U=36, nUD=16, nHTD=16, p<0.001) or the BD group (median=2.24 sec,
IQR=0.80–5.02; Mann-Whitney U=45.5, nUD=16, nBD=16, p=0.002). The HTD and BD
groups did not significantly differ (Mann-Whitney U=99, nHTD=16, nBD=16, p=0.28).
3.3.3. Learning over time—Figure 5C shows estimated WTW over time in each
condition. Unlike Experiment 1, the trajectory was not characterized by a significant linear
trend in any of the three conditions. Average waiting policies appear roughly steady from
minutes 10–18, with an unpredicted shift in the final 1–2 min (see Section 3.4 for
discussion).
Linear trends do largely replicate those in Experiment 1 if analyses are confined to the same
0–10-min window tested in that experiment. Within that period, the UD group shows a
rising linear trend (median coefficient +0.17sec per min, signed-rank T=22, n=16, p=0.02),
while the HTD and BD groups show no trend. The UD group differs significantly from the
HTD group (Mann-Whitney U=60, nUD=16, nHTD=16, p=0.01) but not the BD group
(Mann-Whitney U=108, nUD=16, nBD=16, p=0.46).
3.3.4. Dynamic reversals—To assess participants’ willingness to continue waiting after
having initially chosen patiently, we restricted a followup survival analysis to trials where
participants waited 1 sec or longer (see Fig 5D–E). Median AUC values were 10.80 sec
(IQR=9.82–10.96) in the UD group, 7.48 sec (IQR=6.42–9.21) in the HTD group, and 8.84
sec (IQR=5.24–10.83) in the BD group. Differences were significant between the UD and
HTD groups (Mann-Whitney U=33.5, nUD=16, nHTD=16, p<0.001) and marginal between
the UD and BD groups (Mann-Whitney U=79.5, nUD=16, nBD=16, p=0.07), while the HTD
and BD groups did not differ (Mann-Whitney U=124.5, nHTD=16, nBD=16, p=0.91).
We also assessed the frequency of sub-100ms selections of the small reward, which indicate
a strategy of skipping the large reward entirely. As before, the occurrence of this strategy
was highly variable. The median number of skipped trials was 52 (IQR=7.5–94.5) in the UD
group, 88.5 (IQR=54.5–332) in the HTD group, and 308.5 (IQR=74.5–610.5) in the BD
group. Given the 800ms ITI, these medians correspond to time periods of about 42 sec, 71
sec, and 247 sec, respectively. Differences were significant for the HTD vs. UD group
(Mann-Whitney U=72.5, nUD=16, nHTD=16, p=0.04), and BD vs. UD group (Mann-
Whitney U=53.5, nUD=16, nBD=16, p=0.005), but not the HTD vs. BD groups (Mann-
Whitney U=96, nHTD=16, nBD=16, p=0.24). Thus, individuals in the HTD and BD
conditions exhibited both reduced waiting times and more frequent skipped trials.
Again, there was no evidence that participants could selectively anticipate and skip trials
with long scheduled delays. Scheduled durations of skipped trials were 0.11 sec longer on
average than non-skipped trials (SD=1.37).
3.4. Discussion of Experiment 2
Experiment 2 replicated the main findings of Experiment 1 despite several minor changes
involving the participant pool, compensation, and task duration. In an extension of the
previous findings, the newly introduced BD condition elicited low persistence despite
matching the UD condition for its average delay, maximum delay, and rates of earnings
actually obtained. This result bolsters the conclusion that decision makers calibrate
persistence using temporal inference. It counters the possibility that the differences observed
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in Experiment 1 depended on secondary aspects of the timing environments, such as the
range of possible delays or the monetary rate of return.
The longer duration of Experiment 2 provides an extended picture of performance over time.
Group-level performance appeared to level off near the 8-min mark, with the overall
trajectory no longer well characterized by linear trends. Not all individuals converged on
reward-maximizing levels of persistence even with additional experience, especially in the
HTD and BD groups (see Figure 5B). Timecourses also appeared to shift near minute 19,
when several UD-group participants adopted a trial-skipping strategy. Though we have no a
priori explanation for this observation, we suspect it may reflect an effect of time pressure
on participants’ preference for low-variance outcomes (given that time remaining was
continuously displayed).
4. General discussion
Using a timing manipulation, we created laboratory environments that demanded either
consistent adherence to one’s own previous intertemporal choices, or else the frequent
reversal of such choices. Decision makers adjusted their persistence in the appropriate
direction after short periods of direct experience. These results imply that temporal beliefs
and inferences act as an adaptive influence on people’s willingness to persist toward delayed
outcomes. Our findings are qualitatively consistent with the idea that decision-making
mechanisms function to promote reward rate over time, in agreement with principles of
optimal foraging theory (Brunner, Kacelnik, & Gibbon, 1996; Kacelnik, 2003; Krebs,
Kacelnik, & Taylor, 1978; Mark & Gallistel, 1994). Similar principles have been applied
productively in several other complex decision-making settings (e.g., Cain, Vul, Clark, &
Mitroff, 2011; Simen et al., 2009).
In theoretical examinations of intertemporal choice and delay of gratification, it has
occasionally been noted that reversals can be economically rational if decision makers
believe event timing is governed by a high-variance distribution (Dasgupta & Maskin, 2005;
Rachlin, 2000) or if time passage supports updated assessments of risk (Fawcett et al., 2012;
Sozou, 1998). Our experiments offer empirical support for the importance of these
theoretical observations. Despite the ubiquity of temporal uncertainty in real-life decisions,
most research on delay of gratification focuses on identifying cognitive mechanisms that
could undermine persistence irrespective of temporal expectations (Ainslie, 1975;
Baumeister et al., 1998; Dayan et al., 2006; Loewenstein, 1996; McClure et al., 2004;
Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999).
In light of our findings, it may be possible to reduce the number of situations in which
intrinsically unstable preferences need to be posited. Several of the best-known empirical
demonstrations of persistence failure involve tasks where some kind of limit on persistence
clearly seems appropriate, such as puzzles that are actually impossible (Baumeister et al.,
1998) or delays with no identified endpoint (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970). Behavior in these
tasks has been theoretically interpreted as reflecting an intrinsic limitation on people’s
ability to wait for delayed rewards. In our view, the most compelling evidence for such a
limitation would involve showing that some manipulation (e.g., self-regulatory depletion)
diminished persistence even in an environment such as our UD condition, where statistical
cues unambiguously establish that persistence is advantageous.
We suggest that in order to understand reversals of intertemporal choices, it is essential to
recognize that decision makers can often err by waiting too long as well as too little.
Decision makers face a computational-level problem of calibrating persistence appropriately
to their environment, not merely of maximizing persistence in all cases. Revisiting our
opening quotation from Ainslie (1975), we agree that it is important to understand why
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decision makers change their preferences over time in the absence of new information. In
uncertain environments, however, time passage serves as an important source of information
in its own right (Dasgupta & Maskin, 2005; Fawcett et al., 2012; Rachlin, 2000; Sozou,
1998). If an outcome could have occurred at a short delay, its non-occurrence supports a
revised estimate of the time at which it will arrive in the future. Our empirical results
demonstrate that valid temporal inferences can suffice to produce overt reversals of
intertemporal decisions. Further work should seek to extend this principle to longer time
spans and more naturalistic contexts.
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that performance was not quantitatively
optimal (see Figures 4–5). Participants fell short of the highest available rates of return,
particularly in conditions where limited persistence was the best strategy. One reason may
be the relatively short period of experience. Although performance did not appear to
improve across the final 10 minutes of Experiment 2, we cannot rule out the possibility that
substantial additional experience might yield further gains. If, for example, participants
entered the task with strong prior beliefs about the timing they were likely to encounter, a
large amount of experience might be required for these beliefs to be revised. It is also
possible that providing individuals with additional explicit information about the task’s
structure (e.g., potential ranges of parameters) would help them discover better-performing
strategies.
An important goal for future work, therefore, will be to examine the temporal prior beliefs
that decision makers apply in particular situations, and test how these beliefs are updated
and generalized across contexts. Temporal beliefs presumably depend on past experience
(and perhaps evolutionary history; Stevens, Hallinan, & Hauser, 2005). The qualitative
pattern in our results is consistent with a view that cognitive judgment approximates
Bayesian inference (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2006, 2011; Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010;
Körding & Wolpert, 2004), but a full mechanistic account must accommodate the fact that
individuals differ in the degree of successful calibration they achieve.
Such a mechanistic account might take several forms. One possibility is that participants
develop an internal model of the environment, using previously observed delays to forecast
the consequences of a given persistence policy (akin to our own optimality analysis of the
task). Alternatively, decision makers might rely on simpler approximations of this strategy
such as giving up waiting if the instantaneous probability of reward is perceived as low. It
would also be possible to approach the task in a model-free manner, exploring a range of
different quitting policies and comparing their rates of return.
One aspect of the findings that may prove particularly useful in guiding future theorizing is
that participants were generally more successful (i.e., came closer to the maximum available
earnings) in environments requiring high rather than low persistence. One likely reason is
that low-persistence conditions allow participants to make errors in both directions, waiting
either too long or not long enough. Indeed, errors in both directions were observed:
participants waited too long on average, but also sometimes chose impatiently by ignoring
the delayed reward altogether. A second important difference between high- and low-
persistence environments involves the information that decision makers can gain from
individual events. Quitting provides the participant with only a censored observation of a
delay’s duration (just as, during our data analyses, rewarded trials provide us with only a
censored observation of how long a participant was willing to wait.) Adopting the reward-
maximizing strategy for a low-persistence environment therefore involves sacrificing
information, setting up a potential exploration/exploitation tradeoff. In a changing
environment, this asymmetry of information might make it easier for individuals to shift
from persistence to nonpersistence than vice versa.
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As a final point, our findings suggest new potential avenues toward modifying socially
consequential behaviors (involving diet, finances, substance abuse, etc.) that are traditionally
understood in terms of self-control. Building upon the well-established principle that
intermittent reinforcement yields extinction-resistant learning (Jenkins & Stanley, 1950), our
findings imply that one way to encourage (or curb) persistence would be to intervene on an
individual’s beliefs about the timing environment in which decisions take place.
5. Conclusion
By manipulating the probabilistic timing of rewards, we created environments in which it
was productive either to wait persistently or to abandon rewards after a short time. These
environments elicited very different patterns of behavior, with human participants adopting
either high or low levels of persistence after short periods of direct experience. Our results
suggest that reversals of patient intertemporal choices need not signify a cognitive
limitation, but may instead reflect an adaptive response to temporal uncertainty.
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Highlights
• Participants decided how long to wait for temporally uncertain rewards.
• The distribution of possible delays determines whether persistence is productive.
• Different conditions, matched for reward rate, required high or low persistence.
• With experience, decision makers appropriately adjusted their willingness to
wait.
• Apparent failures of persistence can reflect adaptive temporal judgments.
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Figure 1.
Schematic illustration of how time passage may change a reward’s expected time of arrival.
The left and right columns represent different kinds of beliefs one might hold about an
awaited outcome’s timing. The solid line represents the current time (shown at 0, 2, and 4
minutes). The dashed line represents the outcome’s expected arrival time, defined as the
mean of the area to the right of the current time. For Gaussian beliefs (mean=3, SD=1), the
expected delay starts at 3 minutes and grows shorter with time. For heavy-tailed beliefs
(generalized Pareto distribution [see Equation 2], k=0.5, σ=1.5), the delay starts at 3 minutes
and rises with time.
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Figure 2.
Delay distributions and the resulting payoff functions in each experiment. A: Cumulative
probability of the large reward arriving after a given delay length, for each condition of
Experiment 1. Delays in the UD group followed a uniform distribution (lower bound a=0,
upper bound b=12). Delays in the HTD group followed a generalized Pareto distribution
(shape k=8, scale σ=3.4, location θ=0) truncated at 90 sec. B: Expected total monetary
return under a range of waiting policies for Experiment 1. A waiting policy is defined by the
time at which a subject would give up waiting if the reward had not yet been delivered.
Arrows mark the optimal waiting policy in each condition. C: Cumulative probability
distributions for delay lengths in Experiment 2. The UD group received a uniform
distribution (a=0, b=12), the HTD group received a truncated generalized Pareto distribution
(k=4, σ=5.75, θ=0, truncated at 60 sec), and the BD group received a scaled beta
distribution (shape parameters α=0.25, β=0.25, scaling factor of 12). D: Expected total
monetary return under a range of waiting policies for Experiment 2. Arrows mark each
condition’s reward-maximizing policy.
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Figure 3.
Interface for the behavioral choice task used in both experiments.
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Figure 4.
Results of Experiment 1. A: Mean survival curves, with standard error of the mean (SEM),
sampled at 1-sec intervals, reflecting participants’ willingness to wait in each condition. B:
Area under the survival curve (AUC) for each individual, calculated over the range from 0–
11 sec. Values reflect how long each individual was willing to wait within the first 11 sec of
the delay period. C: Mean estimated willingness to wait (WTW), as a function of time
elapsed in the experimental session (with SEM). Arrows mark the reward-maximizing
policies. D: Mean survival curves (with SEM) restricted to trials in which participants
waited at least 1 sec. E: Each individual’s AUC value for the analysis in Panel D.
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Figure 5.
Results of Experiment 2. Panels correspond to those in Figure 4. A: Mean survival curves
(with SEM) reflecting persistence in each condition. B: AUC values for individual
participants. C: Mean local WTW estimate (with SEM) as a function of time on task, with
arrows marking reward-maximizing policies. D: Mean survival curves (with SEM) restricted
to trials lasting at least 1 sec. E: Individual AUC values corresponding to Panel D.
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